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Waiver of Constitutional Issues in
Criminal Cases: Confusion in the Illinois
Supreme Court
TIMOTHY P. O'NErLL*

I.

INTRODUCTION

If a criminal defendant does not challenge the constitutionality
of a statute at trial, is he precluded from raising the issue on appeal?
On December 30, 1988, the Appellate Court of Illinois, First District,
decided People v. King.' The appellant, convicted under Illinois'

Habitual Criminal Act, 2 challenged the constitutionality of that statute
for the first time on appeal. The court found the appellant had waived
the issue, stating "[ilt is well settled that the question of the constitutionality of a statute cannot be properly raised for the first time in
a court of review, but must have been presented to the trial court and
ruled upon by it, and the person challenging its validity must have
preserved proper objections to such rulings." 3 In support of this
proposition the court cited People v. Amerman ,4 a 1971 Illinois
Supreme Court case.
The citation of Amerman came as no surprise. Over the previous
two decades, Amerman had been the standard citation for the prop* Associate Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School; A.B. Harvard
University; J.D. University of Michigan.
** The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable research assistance of
Nicholas Geiorbano, Esq.
1. 178 II1. App. 3d 340, 533 N.E.2d 520 (1st Dist. 1988) (defendant's failure
to challenge constitutionality of statute at trial constitutes waiver of the issue on
appeal).
2. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 33B-1 (1985).
3. 178 I11.
App. 3d at 347, 533 N.E.2d at 523-24 (citing People v. Amerman,
50 Ill. 2d 196, 279 N.E.2d 353 (1971); People v. Pettigrew, 123 I11.
App. 3d 649, 462
N.E.2d 1273 (1984)).
4. 50 Ill. 2d 196, 279 N.E.2d 353 (1971) (defendant's failure to challenge
constitutionality of statute at trial constitutes waiver of the issue on appeal). In
People v. Bryant, 128 I11.
2d 448, 453-54, 539 N.E.2d 1221, 1224 (1989), the Illinois
Supreme Court claimed to have overruled Amerman in its 1973 decision in People v.
Frey, 54 Il1. 2d 28, 294 N.E.2d 257 (1973). See infra notes 107-116 and accompanying
text.
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osition that in Illinois a'constitutional challenge to a statute could not
be raised for the first time on appeal. Numerous appellate court
decisions relied on Amerman in support of that proposition.'
What did come as a surprise was an Illinois Supreme Court case
6
decided less than five months after King. In People v. Bryant, a7
Code
defendant convicted under a section of the Illinois Vehicle
challenged the constitutionality of that provision for the first time on
appeal. The Illinois Supreme Court cited Amerman, but stated that
it had overruled that case in 1973.8 Since 1973, the court said, a
9
constitutional challenge to a statute could -"be raised at any time. "
Needless to say, the Illinois Supreme Court's observation that
Amerman had not been good law for the last sixteen years may have
come as a shock to those appellate courts which had regularly cited
it during that period. Why would these courts have continued to rely
on a case which had been overruled years before? Who was responsible
for this confusion?
II.

THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT AND "JUDICIAL SIN"

°
Karl Llewellyn in The Common Law Tradition' described a
practice of appellate courts which he characterized as "judicial sin."',
It is a situation in which an appellate court produces "divergent lines
' 2 This article
of [decisions] which deliberately ignore each other.'

5. See, e.g., People v. King, supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text; People
App. 3d 1027, 1043-44, 532 N.E.2d 843, 853 (1st Dist. 1988); People
v. Mays, 176 Ill.
v. Kauffman, 172 Ill. App. 3d 1040, 1043, 527 N.E.2d 645, 647 (1st Dist. 1988);
People v. Cannady, 159 Ill. App. 3d 1086, 1088-89, 513 N.E.2d 118, 119-20 (1st
Dist. 1987); People v. Kokoraleis, 154 I1. App. 3d 519, 527 n.1, 507 N.E.2d 146,
151 n.1 (1st Dist. 1987); People v. Strong, 151 Ill. App. 3d 28, 35, 502 N.E.2d 744,
749 (3d Dist. 1986); People v. Nester, 123 Il.App. 3d 501, 507, 462 N.E.2d 1011,
1016 (2d Dist. 1984); People v. Denby, 102 Ill. App. 3d 1141, 1146, 430 N.E.2d 507,
511 (5th Dist. 1981).
6. 128 Ill. 2d 448, 539 N.E.2d 1221 (1989).
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 4-103(b) (1985).
8. People v. Bryant, 128 Ill. 2d 448, 453-54, 539 N.E.2d 1221, 1223-24 (1989).
The court said that Amerman was overruled by People v. Frey, 54 Ill. 2d 28, 294
N.E.2d 257 (1973). It also noted that Frey had overruled People v. Luckey, 42 Ill.
2d 115, 245 N.E.2d 769 (1969) (holding that the constitutionality of a statute could
not be challenged in an appellate court unless the issue had been raised and ruled on
by the trial court). See Bryant, 128 Ill. 2d at 453-54, 539 N.E.2d at 1223-24.
9. Bryant, 128 Ill. 2d 448, 454, 539 N.E.2d 1221, 1224 (1989).
10. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDINO APPEALS (1960).
11. Id. at 459.
12. Id. at 459-60. Earlier in the book Llwellyn characterized this as "Precedent
Technique Number 39" and labeled it "[filatly illegitimate." Id. at 85.
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contends that Llewellyn's description perfectly characterizes the muddle created by the Illinois Supreme Court regarding whether the
constitutionality of a statute can be challenged for the first time on
appeal. As will be illustrated, the Illinois Supreme Court unthinkingly
constructed two parallel lines of authority on this issue which arrived
at exactly opposite conclusions. 3 If the court chose to characterize
the issue as whether a constitutional challenge could be raised for the
first time on appeal, it could point to a long line of authority
14
exemplified by People v. Amerman stating that the issue was waived.
If, on the other hand, it chose to characterize the issue as one
challenging the validity of an indictment predicated upon an unconstitutional statute, it could cite a similarly long line of authority
holding that a void indictment could be challenged at any time. 5
Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court in Bryant was being disingenuous when it stated that it had overruled Amerman in 1973. Instead
of acknowledging its sloppy jurisprudence in creating parallel, contradictory lines of authority, it pretended that no such conflict existed.
This article will discuss the consequences of the court's clumsy attempt
to re-write history in Bryant. The Bryant opinion, however, cannot
be understood without first considering People v. Amerman and its
progeny.

III.

PEOPLE V. AmERMAN AND PEOPLE V. FREY: THE SEEDS OF
CONFUSION

The defendant in Amerman had been convicted pursuant to the
Firearm Owner's Identification Act. 16 He asked the Illinois Supreme
Court to find that statute unconstitutional. The court noted that,
although defendant's trial attorney's opening statement had included
a claim that the statute in question was "totally unconstitutional,"
no other reference to this claim appeared in either the trial record or
post-trial motions. ' 7 The court then held that a challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute cannot be raised for the first time in a
reviewing court, and that the comment in the opening statement was
"obviously inadequate as a foundation for appeal."18
Illinois appellate courts immediately began to cite Amerman to
support a finding that a defendant had waived a constitutional
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See infra notes 16-26 and 46-52 and accompanying text.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 83-1 (1968).
People v. Amerman, 50 Il1. 2d 196, 197, 279 N.E.2d 353, 354 (1971).
Id.
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argument by failing to raise the issue in the trial court. 19 This continued
unabated until 1989, when the Illinois Supreme Court in Bryant
claimed it had overruled Amerman in People v. Frey20 in 1973.
In Frey, the Illinois Supreme Court had reviewed two consolidated cases dealing with criminal prosecutions under the Illinois
Abortion Statute. 2' In one case, the defendant Frey had filed a motion
to dismiss the indictment, alleging that the statute was unconstitutional. The trial court had granted the motion and the State appealed.
During the pendency of the appeal, however, the United States
Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade.22 On the basis of Roe, the
Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the trial court dismissing
the indictment.
The consolidated case, People v. Mirmelli,23 was different procedurally. There the defendant, Mirmelli, was tried and convicted
under the statute. His convicition was affirmed by the Appellate
Court of Illinois, First District. 24 The appellate court opinion notes
that Mirmelli challenged the constitutionality of the abortion statute
for the first time in his reply brief. Because he had failed to raise the
issue in the trial court, the appellate court found the issue to have
been waived. 25 The Illinois Supreme Court, however, made no mention
of either the appellate court opinion or the waiver issue. Instead, the
court simply reversed the conviction, tersely noting that because the
statute creating the offense was invalid, "a judgment entered thereon
'
[was] erroneous and void. 26

Thus, People v. Frey - the case which Bryant said had overruled
Amerman - not only does not even mention the Amerman case, but
fails to discuss anything even approaching the waiver issue. The
problem, then, was how courts could harmonize Amerman, which
demanded that a constitutional challenge to a statute be raised at trial
or waived, with Frey, which entertained a constitutional challenge
19. See supra note 5.

20. 54 11. 2d 28, 294 N.E.2d 257 (1973).
21. ILL. Rv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 23-1 (1971).

22. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding Texas criminal abortion statutes unconstitutional).
App. 2d 1, 264 N.E.2d 470 (1st Dist. 1970) was
23. People v. Mirmelli, 130 Ill.
consolidated with, and is known at the supreme court level as, People v. Frey, 54
Ill. 2d 28, 294 N.E.2d 257 (1973).
24. People v. Mirmelli, 130 Ill. App. 2d 1, 264 N.E.2d 470 (1st Dist. 1970).
25. Id. at 15-16, 264 N.E.2d at 478.
26. People v. Frey, 54 111. 2d 28, 32, 294 N.E.2d 257, 259 (citing People v.
Collins, 50 Ill. 2d 295, 278 N.E.2d 792 (1972); People v. Hudson, 50 Ill. 2d 1, 276
N.E.2d 345 (1971); People v. Eisen, 357 Ill. 105, 191 N.E. 219 (1934)).
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without even inquiring as to whether the issue was raised below.
IV.

APPELLATE COURT ATTEMPTS TO RECONCILE AMERMAN AND

FREY

A year after the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Frey, the
Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, faced a situation in which
a defendant convicted of unlawful use of weapons 27 challenged the
constitutionality of the statute for the first time on appeal. That case,
People v. Graves,2 held that the constitutional issue was properly
before the court, finding that Frey had "impliedly overruled" Amerman. 29 It based this observation on the fact that the appellate court
report of Mirmelli - the case consolidated with Frey0 - had noted
that Mr. Mirmelli had not raised the issue at the trial court level. 3
Graves thus concluded that Frey-Mirmelli must stand for the proposition that a defendant who has been convicted under an unconstitutional statute may raise the constitutional issue for the first time on
appeal. Therefore, reasoned Graves, Amerman is no longer good law.
The Graves court's contention that Frey-Mirmelliimplicitly overruled Amerman was rejected by at least four courts.3 2 Perhaps the
best reasoned of these cases is People v. Koppen, aa in which the
Second District explained how the Illinois Supreme Court could have
decided Mirmelli without overruling Amerman. According to Koppen,
the rule of Frey is that "[o]nly where the unconstitutionality of a
statute has first been established [does] it become a matter of fundamental justice to apply to subsequent (or consolidated)cases on appeal
even though the issue has not been raised in the trial court."13 4 Thus,
the finding of unconstitutionality in the Frey case applied to Mirmelli
27. ILL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 38, para. 24-1(a)(10) (1973).

28. 23 Ill.
App. 3d 762, 320 N.E.2d 95 (1st Dist. 1974).
29. Id. at 765, 320 N.E.2d at 98.
30. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
31. People v. Graves, 23 Ill. App. 3d at 765, 320 N.E.2d at 98 (quoting People
v. Mirmelli, 130 Ill. App. 2d 1, 15, 264 N.E.2d 470, 478 (1st Dist. 1970)). Again, it
should be emphasized that the supreme court's decision in Frey makes no mention
of the Mirmelli decision at the appellate court level. See supra notes 23-26 and
accompanying text.
32. People v. Koppen, 29 Ill. App. 3d 29, 329 N.E.2d 421 (2d Dist. 1975);
People v. Grammer, 24 Il1. App. 3d 648, 321 N.E.2d 735 (3d Dist. 1974); People v.
Nelson, 26 Ill. App. 3d 227, 324 N.E.2d 719 (5th Dist. 1975); People v. Diaz, 33 Ill.
App. 3d 866, 338 N.E.2d 579 (3d Dist. 1975).
33. 29 Ill.
App. 3d 29, 329 N.E.2d 421 (2d Dist. 1975).
34. Id. at 31, 329 N.E.2d at 423 (emphasis added).
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only because the two cases had been consolidated; for that reason,
each defendant could receive the benefit of Roe v. Wade.
In support of this reading of Frey, the Koppen court also cited
another Illinois Supreme Court case, People v. Sarelli,a1 decided six
months after Frey. In Sarelli, the defendant had filed a petition
pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act36 challenging his conviction under the Narcotic Drug Act.37 Though the circuit court dismissed
the petition, during the pendency of Sarelli's appeal the supreme court
held unconstitutional the very statute Sarelli had challenged.38 Thus,
the supreme court had to decide whether Sarelli's failure to raise the
issue either at trial or on direct appeal should be deemed waiver. The
court found no waiver and reversed Sarelli's conviction.
Koppen contended that Sarelli supported its view that FreyMirmelli had merely created an exception to the Amerman waiver
rule.3 9 Koppen emphasized that Sarelli did not refer to either Amerman
or Frey, and that "if Frey had overruled Amerman, the supreme
court could merely have held that the voidness of the statute was a
jurisdictional question which could be raised at any time; the opinion,
The Frey-Mirmelli case has
however, made no such reference ....
40
Amerman.9"
not overruled
Koppen's argument that Frey had no effect on the decision in
Amerman is persuasive. Indeed, eight months after deciding Frey the
supreme court itself cited Amerman with no suggestion that the case
had been overruled. 41 The Illinois Supreme Court cited Amerman
again in 1979,42 1980,'4 and as recently as 1986," without any indication that the case had been overruled. Moreover, in 1981 in People
v. Myers 5 the supreme court, without citing Amerman, refused to
consider a defendant's challenge to the constitutionality of the statute
under which he was convicted, because the defendant had failed to
raise the issue below.
35. 55 I11.2d 169, 302 N.E.2d 317 (1973).
36. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-1 (1969).
37. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 22-1 (1969) (repealed 1971).
38. The supreme court took this action in People v. McCabe, 49 I11.2d 338,
275 N.E.2d 407 (1971).
39. People v. Koppen, 29 Ill. App. 3d 29, 31, 329 N.E.2d 421, 423 (2d Dist.
1975).
40. Id. Accord People v. Diaz, 33 Ill. App. 3d 866, 338 N.E.2d 579 (3d Dist.
1975).
41. People v. Curry, 56 Ill. 2d 162, 170, 306 N.E.2d 292, 296 (1973).
42. People v. Lykins, 77 Ill. 2d 35, 38, 394 N.E.2d 1182, 1184 (1979).
43. People v. Walker, 83 Ill. 2d 306, 315, 415 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 (1980).
44. People v. Dale, 112 Ill. 2d 460, 467, 493 N.E.2d 1060, 1062 (1986).
45. 85 Ill. 2d 281, 426 N.E.2d 535 (1981).
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Thus, at the time the supreme court decided Bryant, there was
no reason to doubt that Amerman was still good law. Why, then, did
Bryant claim Amerman had been overruled sixteen years before?

V.

Two PARADIGMS

One possible explanation was the existence of an alternative
paradigm in Illinois courts for considering a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute when the issue was raised for the first time on
appeal. Under the paradigm described thus far, an Illinois court
would look at a case characterized as a "constitutional challenge
raised for the first time on appeal," find Amerman to be controlling,
and hold the argument to be "waived."
Yet under a second paradigm, the same claim could be transformed into one challenging the validity of an indictment. This
paradigm would find the indictment to be "void" for being based on
an unconstitutional statute. Traditionally, if an Illinois court views an
indictment or a judgment as "void," waiver does not apply.
It is well established in Illinois that a void judgment may be
attacked and vacated at any time.4 A judgment is characterized as
void where the court lacks jurisdiction over the parties or subject
matter.4 7 As to criminal cases, a trial court lacks jurisdiction if the
indictment does not state a claim. In 1925 the Illinois Supreme Court
stated:
To give a court jurisdiction of the subject matter in a
criminal case it is essential that the accused be charged with a
[and] a judgment is so rendered
crime. If that is not done ....
it is void and may be attacked collaterally.... Inasmuch as
the defendant was not charged in the former indictment with
a violation of any criminal law the court had no jurisdiction
to try, convict and sentence him for the commission of a
criminal offense. The former judgment was void and subject
48
to collateral attack.
46. Fox v. Department of Revenue, 34 Ill. 2d 358, 361, 215 N.E.2d 271, 272
(1966) (dictum); Federal Sign and Signal Corp. v. Czubak, 57 Ill. App. 3d 176, 178,
372 N.E.2d 965, 967 (Ist Dist. 1978) (recognizing principle); Cooper v. United
Development, 122 Ill. App. 3d 850, 854, 462 N.E.2d 629, 632 (Ist Dist. 1984)
(recognizing principle).
47. Horzely v. Horzely, 71 111. App. 3d.542, 545, 390 N.E.2d 28, 30 (Ist Dist.
1989). See also Cooper, supra note 46.
48. People v. Buffo, 318 Ill. 380, 384, 149 N.E. 271, 272 (1925). See also
People v. Minto, 318 Ill. 293, 149 N.E. 241 (1925); People v. Wallace, 316 Ill. 120,
146 N.E. 486 (1925); Klawanski v. The People, 218 Ill. 481, 75 N.E. 1028 (1905).
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The Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 promulgated stricter rules
concerning waiver when the defendant failed to make a pre-trial
motion to dismiss the charge. 49 Nevertheless, the Code specifically
provided that the failure to file such a motion would not waive either
a claim of lack of jurisdiction or a claim that the charge did not state
an offense. 0 Moreover, the Committee Comments to Section 114-1
stated:
Subsection (a) (8) permits the motion to dismiss where
the charge does not state an offense. In accordance with Article
III, charge refers to the complaint, indictment or information.
Since a charge which does not state an offense does not give
defendant a full notice of why he is being tried, and the charge
will not support a judgment unless an offense is stated therein,
due process would be violated and [consequently such a charge]
may be attacked at any time.'
Decisions from the Illinois Supreme Court continued to hold that
indictments which failed to charge an offense were void and could be
2
attacked at any time.
Thus, two very different lines of authority could be applied to
the same set of circumstances. As a consequence, a defendant alleging
for the first time on appeal that the statute supporting his indictment
was unconstitutional could meet two very different fates. On the one
hand, a court could cite Amerman and hold that constitutional issues
not properly preserved were waived. On the other hand, if the court
chose to view the argument as one challenging the validity of the
indictment, it could cite the long line of Illinois authority holding that
a void indictment may be challenged at any time, and thus allow the
defendant to prevail.
This conflict is succinctly illustrated in People v. Wagner." There
the defendant was convicted of selling a substance he represented to
be heroin. Before the appellate court, he contended that the statute

49. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 114-1 (1963).
50. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 114-1(b) (1963).
51. Committee Comments to Section 114-1, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1141 (Smith-Hurd 1977). See also People v. Clark, 256 11. 14, 99 N.E. 866 (1912).
52. People v. Gregory, 59 Ill. 2d 111, 112-13, 319 N.E.2d 483, 484 (1974);
People v. Wallace, 57 Ill. 2d 285, 288, 312 N.E.2d 263, 265 (1974); People v. Heard,
47 Ill. 2d 501, 505, 266 N.E.2d 340, 343 (1970); People v. Reed, 33 111. 2d 535, 53839, 213 N.E.2d 278, 280 (1965).
53. 91 111. App. 3d 254, 414 N.E.2d 773 (5th Dist. 1980), rev'd, 89 Ill. 2d 308,

433 N.E.2d 267 (1982).
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under which he was tried and convicted was unconstitutional because
it punished delivery of innocuous substances more severely than
delivery of controlled substances. 4 The State countered that the
defendant's failure to have raised the issue in a post-trial motion
should result in a waiver." The Fifth District agreed with the State
that a finding of waiver was appropriate and specifically cited Amerman in support of the decision. 6 However, even though the court
said it had "no obligation to do so," it agreed to consider the issue
"as a matter of grace." '5 7
The Illinois Supreme Court subsequently granted defendant's
petition for leave to appeal. Significantly, the supreme court, without
citing Amerman, simply ignored the "waiver" line of cases and held:
Since the conviction here is under an unconstitutional statute
and is therefore a nullity, it was not necessary for defendant
to preserve the error by a post-trial motion. The conviction is
void and can be attacked at any time.5 8
After reading Wagner, one might ask why the defendant in
Amerman was in any different position than the defendant in Wagner.
Both Wagner and Amerman contended that the statutes under which
they were convicted were unconstitutional; yet, arbitrarily, the Illinois
Supreme Court viewed Wagner as a "void indictment" case and
Amerman as a "waiver of a constitutional issue" case. The court
could just as easily have viewed Wagner as the "waiver of a constitutional issue" case and Amerman as the "void indictment" case.
Following the supreme court's decision in Wagner, then, a defendant challenging the constitutionality of the statute supporting his
conviction for the first time on appeal had a "50-50" chance of
prevailing. Whether his conviction was affirmed or reversed depended
on whether the court used Wagner or Amerman.
54. Wagner was convicted of violating Section 404 of the Controlled Substances
Act (ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, para. 1404 (1977)) dealing with sustances merely

represented to be controlled substances. This was a Class 3 felony. He argued that if
he had delivered an actual controlled substance, he would have only been punished
for a Class 4 felony. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, para. 1401(e), (f) (1977).
55. The State argued that the failure to raise the issue in a post-trial motion
resulted in a waiver even though the defendant had, in fact, presented this issue
before the trial court. People v. Wagner, 91 111. App. 3d 254, 256, 414 N.E.2d 773,
775 (5th Dist. 1980), rev'd, 89 111. 2d 308, 433 N.E.2d 267 (1982).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. People v. Wagner, 89 Ill. 2d 308, 311, 433 N.E.2d 267, 269 (1982).
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As an illustration of the bind in which this placed defendants,
consider three Fourth District cases. In a 1984 case disputing the
constitutionality of the Habitual Offender Act,5 9 the court cited
Amerman and found waiver. 6° Yet in a 1986 case disputing the
constitutionality of the retail theft statute, 6' the same court cited
Wagner and found no waiver. 62 Again, however, in a 1987 case
63
challenging the constitutionality of a section of the obscenity statute,
64
the court cited Amerman and found waiver.
The chaos continues. A defendant questioning the constitutionality of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act 65 for the first time on
appeal was told by the Fourth District that Amerman applied and
that he had waived the issue. 66 Yet less than two months later, another
defendant challenged the constitutionality of the aggravated arson
statute67 for the first time in a supplemental brief following oral
argument in the First District. In that case, the court held on the
basis of Wagner that a conviction based upon an unconstitutional
statute is void and can be attacked at any time. 68 However, another
defendant challenging his conviction under the Illinois Narcotics
Racketeering Statute 69 was told by the Second District that he had
waived the issue under Amerman. 70 It should be emphasized that in
none of the six cases just discussed did any court ever suggest that a
split of authority existed; none of the cases relying on Wagner cited
Amerman and vice versa.
VI.

PARADIGMS LOST: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE SECOND DISTRICT

The Second District is an example of a court which has tried to
make sense out of the Wagner/Amerman muddle, apparently assum59. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 33B-1 (1981).
60. People v. Pettigrew, 123 Ill. App. 3d 649, 650, 462 N.E.2d 1273, 1274-75
(4th Dist. 1984).
61. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 16A-10(3) (1983).
62. People v. James, 148 11. App. 3d 536, 537, 499 N.E.2d 1036, 1037 (4th
Dist. 1986).
63. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-20 (1983).
64. People v. McGeorge, 156 I1. App. 3d 860, 871, 510 N.E.2d 1032, 1039
(4th Dist. 1987).
65. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2301-1 (1983).
66. People v. Whitfield, 147 Ill. App. 3d 675, 498 N.E.2d 262 (4th Dist. 1986).
67. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 20-1.1(a)(1) (1981).
68. People v. Orr, 149 Il. App. 3d 348, 500 N.E.2d 665 (1st Dist. 1986).
69. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, paras. 1652, 1654 (1985).
70. People v. Hominick, 177 Il1. App. 3d 18, 38, 531 N.E.2d 1049, 1062 (2d
Dist. 1988) (citing People v. Myers, 85 Ill. 2d 281, 426 N.E.2d 535 (1981); People v.
Amerman, 50 Ill. 2d 196, 279 N.E.2d 353 (1971); People v. Coleman, 120 Ill. App.
3d 851, 459 N.E.2d 5 (2d Dist. 1983)).
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ing that the Illinois Supreme Court considered both decisions to be
good law.
On December 29, 1983, the Second District decided People v.
McNeal.71 There, for the first time on appeal, the defendant claimed
that the retail theft statute 72 under which he was convicted was
unconstitutional. Unlike the cases cited earlier, 73 here the court explicitly rejected Amerman and relied on Wagner stating: "Where, as
here, a substantial question of constitutionality is raised, which if
sustained, would make void the statute under which defendants were
' 74
charged and convicted, we decline to apply the waiver rule.
McNeal leaves several issues unsettled. First, it fails to precisely
define the relationship, if one exists, between Amerman and Wagner.
Second, the source of McNeal's "substantial question of constitutionality" language is unclear. 75 It is not found in Wagner. Can Amerman
be distinguished for its failure to confront a "substantial question of
constitutionality" or does Wagner simply announce a new rule? Third,
the McNeal court reaches the merits of the issue only by "declin[ing]
to apply the waiver rule.' '76 This makes the court's decision appear
to be one of judicial discretion. Yet Wagner seemed predicated on
the lack of jurisdiction found when a void statute is used. 77 Wagner
suggested that courts had the duty to entertain such an issue at any
time, rather than merely the discretion to decline to use waiver.
Any doubt that these were very real issues was soon dispelled.
One day after deciding McNeal, the Second District filed an opinion
in People v. Coleman.71 In Coleman, the defendant for the first time
on appeal challenged the constitutionality of the statute on which she
was convicted. 79 The court's opinion began by citing Amerman for
the "fundamental " ' rule that failure to raise a constitutional question
71. 120 I11.
App. 3d 625, 458 N.E.2d 630 (2d Dist. 1983).
72. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 16A-3 (1981).
73. See supra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
74. People v. McNeal, 201 Ill. App. 3d 625, 627, 458 N.E.2d 630, 631 (2d
Dist. 1983) (citing People v. Wagner, 89 111. 2d 308, 311, 433 N.E.2d 267, 269 (1982)).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. The supreme court in Wagner called the conviction "a nullity" and
2d at 311,
described it as "void." This is hardly the language of "discretion." 89 I11.
433 N.E.2d at 269. See also supra note 53.
App. 3d 851, 459 N.E.2d 5 (2d Dist. 1983).
78. 120 I11.

79. The offense was bringing contraband into a penal institution. ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 31A-1(a)(3) (1981).
80. 120 I11.
App. 3d at 853, 459 N.E.2d at 6 (citing People v. Amerman, 50
II.2d 196, 279 N.E.2d 353 (1971); People v. Luckey, 42 Ill. 2d 115, 245 N.E.2d 769
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in the trial court constitutes a waiver of that issue. The court noted
that the defendant had cited Wagner, however, for the proposition
that the Illinois Supreme Court had established that a conviction
under a void statute could be attacked at any time. 8' The court said
that although some language from Wagner and other cases "arguably
is helpful to the defendant's contention, . . . we [nevertheless] perceive
no indication in those opinions that the waiver rule articulated in
People v. Amerman has been overruled." 2 The court then proceeded
to distinguish the instant case from Wagner because Coleman's constitutional challenge centered not on the language of the statute, but
rather on a procedural infirmity in its enactment. 3 Moreover, the
court criticized the quality of Coleman's evidence s4 and concluded
that it did not feel "compelled''85 to deviate from the waiver rule.
Ms. Coleman, however, filed a Petition for Rehearing alleging
that the court had arbitrarily applied waiver in her case when it had
refused to invoke waiver in the McNeal case decided only one day
earlier. In its Supplemental Opinion on Denial of Rehearing, the
Coleman court lamely contended that it had considered the substance
of Coleman's constitutional arguments, but that it was not "obliged"
to deal with every constitutional argument raised for the first time on

appeal

86

Several months later, the Second District in People v. Nester 7
confronted an appellant contending for the first time on appeal that
the sentencing statute the trial court applied to him was unconstitutional.8 8 The court summarily held the issue to be waived, citing
(1969); People v. Denby, 102 Ill. App. 3d 1141, 430 N.E.2d 1157 (5th Dist. 1981);
People v. Lenninger, 88 11. App. 3d 801, 410 N.E.2d 1157 (2d Dist. 1980); People
v. Jones, 86 Il. App. 3d 253, 408 N.E.2d 79 (5th Dist. 1980); People v. Myers, 85
Ill. 2d 281, 426 N.E.2d 535 (1981)).
81. Id. The defendant cited two other cases in support of this proposition,
People v. McCarty, 94 Il. 2d 28, 445 N.E.2d 298 (1983) and In re T.E., 85 Ill. 2d
326, 423 N.E.2d 910 (1981).
82. Id.

83. Coleman contended that the statute under which she was convicted (ILL.
ch. 38, para. 31A-1(a)(3) (1981)) was void because the language of the
statute was added in its entirety by the Governor in his amendatory veto letter to the
Illinois Senate. Coleman, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 852, 459 N.E.2d at 6.
84. People v. Coleman, 120 I1. App. 3d 851, 853-54, 459 N.E.2d 5, 6-7 (2d
Dist. 1983).
85. Id. at 854, 459 N.E.2d at 7 (2d Dist. 1983).
86. 120 Ill. App. 3d at 854-55, 459 N.E.2d at 7 (citing People v. Myers, 85 Ill.
2d 281, 426 N.E.2d 535 (1981)).
87. 123 I11.App. 3d 501, 462 N.E.2d 1011 (2d Dist. 1984).
88. The statute alleged to be unconstitutional was ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.
I005-8-1(a)(1)(b) (1981).
REV. STAT.
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Amerman and Coleman. 9 There was no sign of the "substantial
constitutional question" language of McNeal. Moreover, the Coleman
citation is ironic since Coleman itself had cited two Illinois Supreme
Court cases which permitted an appellant to raise a constitutional
challenge to a sentencing statute for the first time on appeal, asserting
9°
that a sentence based upon an unconstitutional statute is void.
Nester; unlike Coleman, makes no mention of these cases.
9
It is interesting to compare Nester with People v. Moorhead, 1 a
Second District cased decided only six months later. Like Nester,
92
Moorhead also dealt with the constitutionality of a sentencing scheme.
Responding to the State's claim that the appellant had waived the
issue by not raising it in the trial court, the court cited Wagner and
McNeal and refused to invoke the waiver rule. 93 The court neither
cited Nester nor provided a clue as to why Nester should have been
decided differently.
Next, the Moorhead court went on to consider the merits of the
issue and held for the State by finding the sentencing scheme to be
constitutional." Contrast this with the approach used by the Second
District in People v. Treece.9 For the first time on appeal, Treece96
challenged the constitutionality of certain sexual offense statutes
because of what he alleged to be irrational scaling of possible sen-

tences. 97 The Treece court, after citing Amerman and Coleman for
the general waiver rule, then cited McNeal for the proposition that a
"substantial question of constitutionality" could be raised without
having been preserved at the trial level. 98 Finding that the issue raised

89. People v. Nester, 123 Ill. App. 3d 501, 507, 462 N.E.2d 1011, 1016 (citing
People v. Amerman, 50 11. 2d 196, 279 N.E.2d 353 (1971); People v. Coleman, 120
Il. App. 3d 851, 459 N.E.2d 5 (2d Dist. 1983)).
90. The two cases are People v. McCarty, 94 Ill. 2d 28, 445 N.E.2d 298 (1983)
and In re T.E., 85 Ill. 2d 326, 423 N.E.2d 910 (1981).
91. 128 Ill. App. 3d 137, 470 N.E.2d 531 (2d Dist. 1984).
92. Moorhead contended that it was a violation of due process for Illinois to
punish the offense of solicitation more severely than the offense of conspiracy. People
v. Moorhead, 128 I11.App. 3d 137, 138, 470 N.E.2d 531, 533 (2d Dist. 1984) (holding
that conviction under unconstitutional statute is void and can be attacked at any
time).
93. Id. at 139, 470 N.E.2d at 533-34.
94. Id. at 139-45, 470 N.E.2d at 533-38.
95. 159 Ill. App. 3d 397, 511 N.E.2d 1361 (2d Dist. 1987).
96. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 12-12 to 12-18 (1984 Supp.).
97. Treece, 159 Ill. App. 3d at 414, 511 N.E.2d at 1371.
98. Treece, 159 Il1. App. 3d at 415, 511 N.E.2d at 1372 (citing People v.
McNeal, 120 Ill. App. 3d 625, 627, 458 N.E.2d 630, 631 (2d Dist. 1983); People v.
Wagner, 89 Ill. 2d 308, 311, 433 N.E.2d 267, 269 (1982)).
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by Treece had been decided adversely to his position by other courts,
the court concluded that it was not a "substantial question" and
therefore held that it had been waived. 99
Note the circular reasoning in Treece: first, in order to decide if
a question is "substantial" a court should consider the merits; second,
if a defendant loses on the merits, it is not a substantial question;
third, if it is not a substantial question, then a court can refuse to
reach the merits by finding waiver; fourth, thus, waiver will be found
where a defendant would lose on the merits. In a nutshell, according
to Treece the court must answer the question before it chooses whether
to consider the question! Why the Second District decided Moorhead
and Treece in such disparate ways is a mystery.' °°
The Second District's confused, yet well-intentioned, attempts at
harmonizing Amerman and Wagner culminated in its opinion in
People v. Hominick, 0 decided merely five months before the Illinois
Supreme Court's opinion in Byrant. Hominick challenged, for the
first time on appeal, the constitutionality of Illinois' narcotics racketeering statute. 02 The Hominick court cited Amerman, of course,
for the general proposition of waiver. Yet instead of following its
McNeal approach of considering whether the constitutional question
was "substantial,"' '0 3 the court found waiver by citing the Second
District decision in Koppen'0 4 - decided seven years before the
supreme court's sentencing decision in Wagner'05 - for the proposition that only where the unconstitutionality of a statute had already
been established would the waiver rule be relaxed.,06
It is easy to criticize the legal gyrations used by the Second
District in attempting to harmonize Amerman and Wagner. Yet the
real culprit was the Illinois Supreme Court, which stubbornly refused
99. Id.

100. See also, People v. Leonard, 171 Ill.
App. 3d 380, 385, 526 N.E.2d 397,

400 (2d Dist. 1988) (holding that a constitutional challenge was not a "substantial
question" without providing any reason).
101. 177 Ill. App. 3d 18, 531 N.E.2d 1049 (2d Dist. 1988).

102. People v. Hominick, 177 Ill.
App. 3d 18, 37-38, 531 N.E.2d 1049, 1062
(2d Dist. 1988) (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, paras. 1652, 1654 (1985)).

103. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.

104. People v. Koppen, 29 I11.
App. 3d 29, 329 N.E.2d 421 (2d Dist. 1975). See

supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
105. People v. Wagner, 89 I11.
2d 308, 433 N.E.2d 267 (1982). See supra notes
53-58.
106. People v. Hominick, 177 I1. App. 3d at 38, 531 N.E.2d at 1062 (citing
People v. Gully, 151 I11.
App. 3d 795, 502 N.E.2d 1091 (5th Dist. 1986); People v.
Koppen, 29 11. App. 3d 29, 329 N.E.2d 421 (2d Dist. 1975).
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to recognize that it had spawned two irreconcilable lines of authority
in a crucial area of constitutional criminal procedure. The misguided
way in which it created the problem was matched by the equally
misguided way it attempted to solve the problem in People v. Bryant.
VII.

PEOPLE V. BRYANT: THE SUPREME COURT RECOGNIZES (AND
EXACERBATES) THE PROBLEM

Interestingly, the first decision which appears to have simply

declared that the Amerman and Wagner approaches were irreconcil-

able was the appellate court opinion in People v. Bryant.'°7 There the
First District described these approaches as representing "two divergent views."' °0 Only in reviewing this decision did the Illinois Supreme
Court finally claim that it had overruled Amerman through the Frey
case in 1973.'09

It is difficult to understand what compelled the court to make
such a claim. As noted earlier, Frey contains no mention of Amerman." 0 The Illinois Supreme Court continued to cite Amerman

throughout the 1970's and 1980's without any indication that it was
2
no longer good law."' Moreover, its 1981 decision in Myers" implicitly showed that it considered the Amerman waiver rule to be sound."'
Further-more, in the Illinois Supreme Court's haste to pretend
that Amerman had been overruled sixteen years before, it may have
conceded far more than it intended. Recall that the reason Wagner
held that a defendant could raise the invalidity of the statute under
which he was convicted for the first time on appeal was that a void
indictment deprived the trial court of jurisdiction."14 So, too, in People
App. 3d 996, 520 N.E.2d 890 (1st Dist. 1988), rev'd on other
107. 165 Ill.
grounds, 128 Il.2d 448, 539 N.E.2d 1221 (1989). Note that the First District cites
People v. Luckey, 42 Ill. 2d 115, 245 N.E.2d 769 (1969), instead of People v.
Amerman, 50 Ill. 2d 196, 279 N.E.2d 353 (1971), for the supreme court's view on
waiver. Luckey and Amerman exhibit similar approaches to waiver. For a discussion
of Luckey, see supra note 8.
108. People v. Bryant, 165 Ill. App. 3d 996, 998-99, 520 N.E.2d 890, 892 (1st
Dist. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 128 Ill. 2d 448, 539 N.E.2d 1221 (1989).
109. Bryant, 128 Ill. 2d at 453-54, 539 N.E.2d at 1223-24 (1989). Note that the
supreme court also found that Frey overruled People v. Luckey. For a discussion of
Luckey, see supra note 8.
110. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text. Frey also includes no mention

of Luckey.

111. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. Note that the Myers court did
not cite Amerman.
114. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
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v. Wade' the court viewed a sentence which exceeded the court's
authority to be similarly void. But note that in Bryant the supreme
court does not limit its repeal of the Amerman waiver rule only to
those constitutional claims which would result in void indictments or
sentences. Instead, the court simply said "now, a constitutional
1 6
challenge to a statute can be raised at any time." "
If that is true, consider a case such as People v. Boclair."'7 In the
appellate court, the defendant for the first time alleged that the
enactment of Supreme Court Rule 41311a on prosecutorial discovery
was unconstitutional because it violated separation of powers princi20
ples."19 The appellate court found the issue to have been waived.' If
the supreme court's holding in Bryant is taken seriously, it would
suggest that valid judgments and sentences could always be collaterally
attacked so long as a defendant is able to raise a constitutional
challenge to some aspect of his case. Does Bryant really mean that a
constitutional issue such as that raised in Boclair can be raised at
"any time?" Only time, and the Illinois Supreme Court, will tell.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Re-writing history is a dangerous activity. The Illinois Supreme
Court was long overdue in recognizing the existence of parallel
"loops" - the "constitutional issue not raised at trial" loop and the
"void judgment" loop - which enabled Illinois courts to come to
opposite conclusions in identical cases of tardily raised constitutional
issues. Before Bryant, the result had been determined solely by which
"loop" of law a specific case happened to have been placed. Yet
instead of acknowledging the problem in People v. Bryant, the
supreme court simply "wished it away" by pretending that it had
overruled contrary precedent sixteen years before.' 2' The intellectual
115. 116 Il. 2d 1, 506 N.E.2d 954 (1987) (sentence of probation, entered by
trial court in mistaken belief that defendant had no prior conviction, was void
judgment).
116. Bryant, 128 Ill. 2d at 454, 539 N.E.2d at 1224 (citing People v. Zeisler,
125 Il1. 2d 42, 531 N.E.2d 24 (1988); People v. Sarelli, 55 Ill. 2d 169, 302 N.E.2d
317 (1973)).
117. 139 Il1. App. 3d 350, 487 N.E.2d 969 (4th Dist. 1985), rev'd on other
grounds, 119 Ill. 2d 368, 519 N.E.2d 437 (1987).
118. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. [10A, para. 413 (1985).
119. Boclair, 139 Il1. App. 3d at 352, 487 N.E.2d at 971.
120. Boclair, 139 Ill. App. 3d at 352, 487 N.E.2d at 971.
121. See People v.Ward, 194 Il1.
App. 3d 229, 232, n.l, 550 N.E.2d 1208,
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dishonesty of such a project is clear enough. Yet, as shown above, in
its rush to revise history, it may very well have promulgated a rule
far broader than necessary. Bryant will result in new constitutional
issues being raised in tangential areas of cases at every level of direct
and collateral review.
In George Orwell's novel 1984, Winston Smith's job was to
change the past by destroying those documents not in keeping with
the government's current views. 22 The repercussions of People v.
Bryant may make the Illinois Supreme Court regret its attempt to
engage in a similar activity.

1210, n.1 (1st Dist. 1990) (citing Bryant and stating that the waiver of constitutional
issues "has had a confusing history in Illinois law"). The Bryant court, of course,
would not acknowledge this.
122. G. ORWELL, 1984 (1949).

